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IT CAME, AS ONE OBSERVER NOTED, “out of a clear sky.”
1
At 9:25 p.m. on 4 August
1914, the people of Newfoundland, then a self-governing colony of the British Em-
pire,
2
were notified officially that they were at war with Germany and Austria-
Hungary. With a population of slightly less than 250,000 people, 32,000 of them in
the city of St. John’s, Newfoundland hardly counted as a major player on the world
stage, and appeared quite unlikely to have any significant impact on the war in Eu-
rope. Most of the colony’s workforce was involved in the fishery, with smaller
numbers employed in the mining and forestry sectors, as there was little in the way
of manufacturing or other industry.
3
Its government, led by Prime Minister Sir Ed-
ward Morris, was considered to be perilously weak, presiding over a polity sharply
divided along regional, sectarian, and class lines.
4
In terms of being a potential par-
ticipant in an armed conflict, Newfoundland was, according to one source, “as
complete an example of unpreparedness and pacifism as could be found in the
world.”
5
By the end of 1915, however, the 1st Newfoundland Regiment, an infantry
unit composed entirely of Newfoundlanders, was in action at Gallipoli, and large
numbers of Newfoundlanders were serving on warships of the Royal Navy. Before
the war ended, the Newfoundland Regiment would serve with distinction in some
of the conflict’s most savage battles, earning, in the words of one recent writer, “a
reputation second-to-none as a battalion that could be entirely depended upon
whatever the cost.”
6
It was a remarkable and entirely unexpected accomplishment
for a country with, as one British politician noted, “a population half that of Wands-
worth.”
7
Accounts of the history of Newfoundland’s military experience in World War
I have long drawn heavily on Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson’s The Fighting
Newfoundlander, an official regimental history published in 1963.
8
While Nichol-
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son’s work is very impressive as far as such officially commissioned publications
go, after the passage of several decades it tends to show its age, as it consists mainly
of a traditional “battle narrative”
9
with only a minimal amount of analysis. Most re-
cently published work on the Newfoundland Regiment focuses mainly on ques-
tions of the war experiences of Newfoundlanders and the place of the war effort in
Newfoundland’s cultural memory.
10
Robert J. Harding, for instance, has written on
the centrality of the disastrous battle of Beaumont Hamel to the war’s legacy in
Newfoundland, and how that has shaped public memory of the war.
11
Such works
contribute greatly to our understanding of the impact of the war on
Newfoundlanders and on their country, but generally say little about how the New-
foundland Regiment came into being and why its administration took the form that
it did, beyond a reiteration of elements of Nicholson’s account. The only major
work that studies in detail the administration of Newfoundland’s war effort is an
unpublished MA thesis from 1981 which looks at the work of the Newfoundland Pa-
triotic Association.
12
The time seems to have come for a reconsideration of this as-
pect of Newfoundland’s wartime history.
This paper will examine the mobilization and administration of the Newfound-
land Regiment over the first year of the war, from its inception in August 1914 to its
entry into combat in the Dardanelles campaign in September 1915. In the course of
this examination, it will attempt to gain insight into the way in which a country
without even the slightest degree of serious military preparation attempted to raise,
organize, and train an effective fighting force. While Newfoundland succeeded in
producing a fighting unit renowned for its dedication and bravery,
13
the hasty and
haphazard nature of the process of mobilization led to deficiencies in administra-
tion which would result in some difficult and divisive problems as the world con-
flict escalated. Certain measures taken, and in cases not taken, in the period of
mobilization would come back to haunt Newfoundland in the later stages of the
war, as the country was forced to adopt conscription in 1918, exacerbating an al-
ready acrimonious political climate. By the war’s end Newfoundland would be left
with little of lasting substance to show for its efforts other than a greatly expanded
public debt. While these problems in no way overshadow the storied performance
of the Regiment on the battlefield, they are a necessary part of any clear understand-
ing of Newfoundland’s part in the war and the war’s part in Newfoundland history.
THE CALL TO ARMS
Britain’s declaration of war against the Central Powers was greeted with enthusi-
asm by many Newfoundlanders, and nowhere was that enthusiasm greater than in
the capital city. According to the Mail and Advocate, “thousands of citizens of St.
John’s paraded the streets singing patriotic songs,” and large crowds visited the
homes of the governor, the prime minister, and the French consul, as well as HMS
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Calypso, training ship for the local branch of the Royal Naval Reserve.
14
The de-
gree of excitement in the city, said one contemporary writer, “could not have been
greater if the enemy were at the entrance of Saint John’s harbour.”
15
Within hours,
an unofficial propaganda campaign in support of the Empire’s war effort was be-
gun by the local press. Articles and editorials explaining the causes of the war, al-
ways from a decidedly British perspective, and emphasizing its importance to
Newfoundland, quickly became a regular feature of St. John’s newspapers. Most
dwelt at length on the evils of Prussian militarism, while a few speculated on the
dire consequences of a possible German takeover of Newfoundland.
16
The war ef-
fort was also promoted as a way to enhance Newfoundland’s position within the
British Empire, on the grounds that the colony’s contribution would earn the coun-
try “a distinguished place in whatever scheme is developed for closer Imperial Fed-
eration when the war is over.”
17
With the propaganda campaign in full swing, local
businesses quickly took advantage of the outburst of patriotic fervour. A few days
after the declaration of war, the Nickel Theatre put on a special show featuring pic-
tures of warships and military leaders, and one local paper reported that “those
present went wild over it.”
18
By September, local bookstores were advertising
newly arrived stocks of war-related books, soon followed by scores for patriotic
songs.
19
Considering this atmosphere of popular pro-war sentiment in the capital
city, there could be little doubt that Newfoundland would endeavour to contribute
to the military effort of the Empire.
Such a contribution was, however, much easier to advocate than to accom-
plish. Newfoundland hardly seemed likely to be able to raise a land force for over-
seas service, particularly given that there was no existing military organization in
the colony.
20
Indeed, at the outbreak of World War I, the only official security
forces in Newfoundland were the 100 men of the Newfoundland Constabulary.
21
In
the mid-nineteenth century, there had been a small garrison of imperial troops in
Newfoundland, but this force had been withdrawn by the British government in
1870 on the grounds that its main task had become the prevention of civil disorder
rather than the defence of the colony against foreign aggression.
22
In the 1880s, the
Colonial Defence Committee in London repeatedly urged the Newfoundland gov-
ernment to raise small units of infantry and artillery, for which the imperial authori-
ties were willing to foot the bill. The government refused, however, fearing that
Newfoundland, already smarting under the weight of a global recession, would
eventually be forced to contribute to the upkeep of such a force. When the economy
began to improve in the late 1890s, the government of Sir James Winter agreed to
allow the establishment of a Royal Newfoundland Naval Reserve, on the condition
that such a scheme would not interfere with the fishery.
23
The Naval Reserve would
prove to be a success, growing to a strength of roughly 600 trained men by 1914.
24
No land forces, however, were established. A small number of Newfoundlanders
had enlisted in the Canadian contingent during the Anglo-Boer War, but the coun-
try had rejected the idea of sending its own unit.
25
Although Governor Sir Henry
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McCallum suggested the creation of a Newfoundland contingent in 1899, the gov-
ernment informed him that it would have been financially impossible.
26
The war of
1914, however, would be different.
Perhaps the nearest thing to a military force in Newfoundland in 1914 were the
local cadet brigades, which were organized under the auspices of the four main reli-
gious denominations. The first of these was the Church Lads Brigade [CLB], formed
by the Anglican Church in 1892. This was followed by the establishment of the
Catholic Cadet Corps in 1896, and the Methodist Guards two years later. The small-
est brigade, the Newfoundland Highlanders, was created by the Presbyterian Kirk
in 1907.
27
These brigades consisted of boys aged 15 to 19, organized “for drill and
athletic purposes, with a colour of military discipline.” The brigades were estab-
lished, however, “with no thought of war as a possible experience for their mem-
bers.”
28
The only other organization in Newfoundland with any militaristic inclination
was the local branch of the Legion of Frontiersmen, a private paramilitary organi-
zation founded after the Anglo-Boer War by Roger Pocock, an ex-RCMP officer,
and based in the United Kingdom. The Legion differed from the cadet brigades in
that it was composed of adult men and was not affiliated with any religious denomi-
nation. The organization was open to any man over 18 years of age who had either
“seen active service in a war, ... had training at sea [or] knocked about in the wilds.”
The Newfoundland levy of the Legion was formed in 1911 by Dr. A.W. Wakefield,
a physician with the Grenfell Mission in Battle Harbour, Labrador. Units of Fron-
tiersmen were established at St. John’s, Greenspond, and St. Anthony on the island,
as well as at Nain, Mud Lake, Hopedale, and Grand River in Labrador.
29
In 1912,
the local Legion applied to the War Office for 50 rifles, but the request was turned
down on the grounds that the Legion was a purely private venture and not part of
any official system of imperial defence.
30
By 1914, the Legion had over 150 mem-
bers in Newfoundland, “formed and trained for ‘the Day,’ which the Legion saw
coming.”
31
On 7 August, Wakefield had informed Governor Walter Davidson that
50 men of the Legion of Frontiersmen were ready to go overseas to join the main
body of the Legion in London, and transportation was quickly arranged through the
War Office.
32
The general lack of preparedness was not enough to prevent Newfoundland’s
more vocal classes from demanding that Newfoundland “do its bit.” In the first week
of the war, without anything approaching sufficient time for a reasoned debate on
the matter, it became clear that Newfoundland’s contribution to the war would be
far greater than anything which could have been predicted a few days earlier. In-
deed, the local elite in St. John’s almost instantly adopted the idea that the colony
should raise its own overseas contingent, rather than simply provide volunteers for
Canadian and British forces. Governor Davidson already had something similar in
mind. On 8 August, he wired Colonial Secretary Lewis Harcourt requesting authority
to raise troops in Newfoundland for service overseas, and permission to do so was
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granted the following day.
33
Four days later, an “immense gathering of all classes”
was convened in the CLB Armoury to hear Davidson announce his intention to raise
a Newfoundland contingent of 500 men for service overseas, a proposal which met
with “great enthusiasm.”
34
Davidson said that, since the colony was “poor in money
vocal [but] rich in men,” such a unit would be Newfoundland’s most appropriate
contribution to the war, and he expressed his hope that the contingent would even-
tually number 5,000 men.
35
While Davidson’s idea was well received, it posed some tough political prob-
lems. Public enthusiasm notwithstanding, the government was ill-prepared to un-
dertake such a task, given that no bureaucratic or legislative mechanism existed in
Newfoundland for enlisting, equipping, or administering military personnel.
36
In
addition, Newfoundland’s political situation was extremely unstable, as the very
legitimacy of the Morris government was disputed by many Newfoundlanders.
While Morris’s People’s Party held a majority of seats in the House of Assembly,
the opposition alliance of William F. Coaker’s Fishermen’s Protective Union [FPU]
and John Kent’s Liberals had received a larger percentage of the popular vote in the
1913 election. Davidson, meanwhile, had little respect for the Newfoundland polit-
ical system, and thought that the country would be better ruled as a crown colony.
37
The fractious nature of the colony’s politics, combined with the governor’s dis-
missive attitude toward the institution of responsible government, would pro-
foundly affect the shape which Newfoundland’s contribution of military forces to
the war would take.
In what has been aptly termed “a bizarre abdication of responsibility,”
38
the
Morris government handed the entire business of creating and maintaining a con-
tingent over to Davidson, who was more than delighted to take personal control of
the war effort. A committee of 25 prominent citizens with Davidson as its chair-
man, christened the Newfoundland Patriotic Association, was formed to enlist and
equip what was to become the 1st Newfoundland Regiment.
39
The idea behind the
Association’s formation was, as Davidson later stated, to “place the conduct of all
matters associated with the War outside the domain of party politics.”
40
Left unsaid
by Davidson, but implicit in his approach to the matter, was the fact that it placed
Newfoundland’s war effort outside the purview of responsible government.
The initial reception of Davidson’s initiative took on a partisan tinge, as was
typical of almost any public venture in Newfoundland at the time. Pro-government
newspapers welcomed the announcement of the formation of a Patriotic Associa-
tion, saying that partisanship should be put aside and requesting a return to the days
when “None was for a party / And all were for the State.”
41
The arrangement had
considerable appeal for Morris and his cohorts, since it allowed them to sidestep de-
mands for a wartime coalition government that would have had to include Coaker.
42
This did not satisfy the opposition. The Mail and Advocate, official organ of the
FPU, denounced the patriotic meeting as a “partisan fraud,” meant to revive the sag-
ging popularity of the Morris government. While the Advocate came out strongly in
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support of a war to defend the world against Prussian militarism, and in particular
embraced the need to save “brave Belgium,”
43
it complained about the lack of con-
sultation with opposition parties and called the government’s decision to hand over
control of the war effort to a group of private citizens an admission of incompe-
tence. The Advocate further questioned whether the entire country should be bound
by the decisions of a gathering of the upper classes of St. John’s.
44
Nevertheless,
Davidson’s “improvised department of war” continued to exercise complete con-
trol over the country’s war effort until 1917, when a National Coalition Govern-
ment established an official Department of Militia.
45
In order for the Patriotic Association to function in Newfoundland’s rather ac-
rimonious political environment, the government believed that it had to “be com-
posed of people of all classes, and creeds, and shades of political belief.” Its
members were appointed judiciously, in order to ensure that no group felt left out.
46
The resulting body was, as Davidson put it, “well balanced,” the 12-member Exec-
utive Committee being equally divided among Anglicans, Methodists, and Roman
Catholics.
47
This denominational balance was essential if the project was to receive
the endorsement of Newfoundland’s powerful religious hierarchy. But while the
Patriotic Association represented a cross-section of Newfoundland society in terms
of religious affiliation, in socio-economic terms it did not. Its membership con-
sisted almost entirely of men from the merchant and professional classes. Few
came from the labouring classes of wage workers or fishermen, whose only repre-
sentation was in the form of a handful of union leaders.
48
From the beginning, almost all of Newfoundland’s politicians were quite vocal
in their support for the idea of raising a contingent, though most would scrupu-
lously avoid any direct involvement in recruiting.
49
One early dissenting voice was
that of William Coaker. Although “an ardent Imperialist of the old-fashioned type”
and a supporter of the war effort in general, Coaker was opposed to the whole no-
tion of raising an infantry regiment, believing that Newfoundland would do better
to expand the Naval Reserve and to increase its production of food for Britain. He
added that Newfoundlanders who wanted to serve on land could join the Canadian
Expeditionary Force. Eventually, however, once the Regiment had been created
and “when it developed that the affair would be a long-drawn-out one,” Coaker be-
came one of the Regiment’s most ardent supporters, and one of the few politicians
who actively assisted in recruiting for the unit.
50
The Anglican and Methodist
clergy, meanwhile, almost unanimously supported the war effort, as did most New-
foundland-born Roman Catholic priests and the Catholic archbishop, Michael F.
Howley.
51
Irish-born priests tended in general to be less enthusiastic, if not outright
opposed.
52
The women of Newfoundland also mobilized in support of the Regi-
ment. On 31 August 1914, a Women’s Patriotic Association [WPA] was formed,
with over 500 members, including Lady Davidson as its president.
53
Over the next
four years, the WPA would provide the men of the Regiment with woollen clothing
and other comforts, as well as undertaking a variety of other war-related work.
54
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A MOTLEY CREW: RECRUITING AND PERSONNEL
On 21 August, the governor issued an official proclamation, calling for volunteers
to fight in “the greatest War in the history of the World.” Men between 19 and 35
years of age were asked to report to the CLB Armoury or to the nearest magistrate to
enlist for overseas service “for the duration of the war, but not exceeding one year.”
Passage to St. John’s was provided free of charge, and recruits were to be paid one
dollar per day from the time of enrolment, the same rate of pay given to soldiers of
the Canadian contingent.
55
Once the formation of a Newfoundland contingent was
announced, the local Frontiersmen cancelled their plans to go to England as a sepa-
rate unit and instead were incorporated into the Regiment. These men would form
“the nucleus of the first contingent.”
56
Within a week of the official proclamation,
335 men had volunteered, almost all from the local cadet brigades.
57
Given the en-
thusiastic response of the cadets to the call for volunteers, local newspapers quickly
recanted their earlier criticism of the cadet brigades, and proclaimed the cadet
movement to have been a great idea all along.
58
The Patriotic Association had little trouble in meeting Davidson’s initial quota
of 500 men, particularly since Newfoundland was suffering from a “commercial
depression” which left many unemployed or underemployed.
59
Some joined out of
a desire for employment, some for adventure, and some from a sense of duty. One
member of the Regiment later provided a rather romantic description of the “mot-
ley crew” who answered the first call for volunteers:
The city brigades, composed of young, beautifully fit athletes from rowing crews,
football and hockey teams, enlisted in a body. Every train from the interior brought
lumbermen, fresh from the mills and forests, husky, steel-muscled, pugnacious at the
most peaceful times, frankly spoiling for excitement. From the outharbours and fish-
ing villages came callous-handed fishermen, with backs a little bowed from straining
at the oar, accustomed to a life of danger. Every day there came to the armory loose-
jointed, easy-swinging trappers and woodsmen, simple-spoken young men, who, in
offering their keenness of vision and sureness of marksmanship, were volunteering
their all. It was ideal material for soldiers.
60
According to one daily newspaper, the volunteers came “from all classes, from the
ranks of the wealthy and the labourer, the scholar and the unschooled, the profes-
sional and the tradesman.”
61
In fact, however, a disproportionate number of the ini-
tial volunteers came from the mercantile and professional classes of St. John’s.
62
According to some writers, response to the call for volunteers would have been
even greater if the war had not begun during the fishing season.
63
It quickly became clear that this early enthusiasm for the war was primarily an
urban phenomenon. At least 80 percent of the men who formed the first contingent
were from the two St. John’s electoral districts.
64
The volunteer movement was
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barely three weeks old when complaints about the lack of outport volunteers began
to surface.
65
The problem was particularly noticeable in districts farther removed
from St. John’s. As one frustrated recruiting officer said of a tiny community in
White Bay,
Sopp’s Island is a terribly isolated place. For all the public service the residents get,
they might well be forgiven if they failed to appreciate that they belonged to any Em-
pire or to any group outside of themselves.
66
The situation was similar in Labrador. Dr. H.L. Paddon reported from Indian Har-
bour that, when the war broke out, most people in the community “did not know
which side they were on,” and that there was “much indifference and not a little
treasonable talk.” Many, indeed, on the grounds that they were receiving nothing
from the powers that be in St. John’s, suspected that they “couldn’t be worse off if
the Germans took the country.”
67
Some outport people were also suspicious of the
motives of the newly created military authorities. Davidson later noted that “when
we first sent a few piquets in 1915 to guard remote inlets ... the women drove their
men ... into the scrub, fearing that the ‘press gang’ was out.”
68
While recruitment for the Regiment was initially much higher in St. John’s
than in rural areas, it should not be assumed that the outports did not contribute to
the war effort. The number of rural recruits began to increase after the fishing sea-
son ended. Also, since recruits were listed according to where they joined rather
than their place of origin, some outport men were officially registered as being from
St. John’s.
69
As well, of the roughly 2,000 men who served in the Naval Reserve
during the war, almost all were recruited from the outports.
70
Another 505 men,
again mainly from the outports, served in the merchant marine.
71
Support for the
war effort in the more remote outports, however, usually tended to come mainly
from younger members of the community who had received formal education.
72
While the influence of local leaders, such as clergymen, magistrates, and politi-
cians, was an important factor in recruiting, as a general rule, the further a district
was from St. John’s, the fewer recruits it provided, at least in the first months of the
war.
73
The discrepancy in recruiting between urban and rural areas can be accounted
for at least in part by the socio-economic circumstances of the country. The number
of men of military age available to recruiters was relatively lower in the outports
than in St. John’s, since the fishery required many able-bodied young men. Many
people in fishing communities feared that the fishery would suffer if too many men
volunteered.
74
Few St. John’s residents, on the other hand, made their living directly
from the fishery. High unemployment and low wages, combined with a steady in-
flux of people from the outports, mainly young men, into St. John’s, meant that
there were a large number of men of military age in the city available for service
overseas.
75
There was also more social pressure on city men to volunteer. Various
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clubs and societies promoted recruiting, and propaganda was much more intense,
particularly through the agency of the city’s five daily newspapers.
76
To make service even easier for urban residents, most employers in the city
agreed to keep volunteers’ positions open, something which did not happen in the
outport fishery. In late August, the government decided to supplement the pay of
civil servants who volunteered for the Regiment, in order to bring their earnings up
to the level of their civilian salaries, provided that their departments agreed that
they could be spared.
77
Similar arrangements were later made for postal employees
and for schoolteachers.
78
Pay was indeed a concern of many potential recruits. One
man from Harbour Grace refused to enlist for one dollar a day, but said that he
would be willing to go overseas for $1.30. In response, one official remarked that
“this kind of patriot ... is not very desirable.”
79
The Government, however, was also
thinking about money. While there were a number of married men among the vol-
unteers, the government wanted to make sure that only unmarried men with no de-
pendents were sent overseas, for fear that the latter would “become a charge on the
funds of the Colony.”
80
Once recruiting was underway, the organizers of the Regiment were faced
with the problem of accommodating sectarian interests. While all volunteers ini-
tially enlisted as privates,
81
in mid-September the Patriotic Association published a
notice in local papers soliciting applications for commissions in the Regiment.
82
The need for officers immediately raised the question of sectarianism, a hardy pe-
rennial in local politics. The policy of the Newfoundland government, dating back
to the 1860s, was to allocate all government appointments and patronage on a pro-
portional basis to Newfoundland’s three main Christian denominations.
83
In keep-
ing with that long-standing custom, the Patriotic Association adhered to the so-
called “spoils system” when it came to the issue of promotions. The first group of
ten officers commissioned by Davidson included three Roman Catholics, three
Methodists, and three Anglicans, all of whom had been officers in the sectarian ca-
det corps.
84
To further prevent sectarian squabbling, Davidson appointed himself as
interim Lieutenant-Colonel of the Regiment, until the unit was sent overseas and
commanding officer could be appointed from the British Army.
85
The need to accommodate sectarian rivalries, however, would become an in-
surmountable obstacle when it came time to appoint a regimental chaplain, since
the War Office refused to approve the appointment of three chaplains to one battal-
ion. Unable for political reasons to choose between rival offers from the various de-
nominations, the Patriotic Association decided that the Regiment would have to be
sent overseas without the services of a chaplain.
86
This decision, however, did not
go unchallenged. Father Thomas Nangle, chaplain of the Catholic Cadet Corps, im-
mediately threatened to withdraw all Roman Catholics from the contingent. Al-
though Nangle was persuaded to withdraw his threat, he insisted that the lack of a
Roman Catholic chaplain was hurting recruiting, since many parents would not let
their sons enlist unless there was a priest attached to the unit.
87
It was only in July
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1916, after the disaster at Beaumont Hamel, that the War Office agreed to allow the
Regiment three chaplains, including Father Nangle.
88
Along with the need to appoint regimental officers, the Patriotic Association
also had to find men to supervise logistics and training for the nascent contingent.
Only one of the volunteers had ever seen military action. Conn Alexander, who had
served as a British officer in the Anglo-Boer War, happened to be in St. John’s
when war was declared and was one of the first men granted a commission in the
Regiment.
89
One of Alexander’s first tasks was the selection of non-commissioned
officers for the Regiment from among the many volunteers.
90
Administration of the
unit, meanwhile, became the responsibility of A.J. Montgomerie, local manager of
Furness Withy Steamships and a former Canadian Militia officer. Montgomerie, a
native of Halifax, would later draw criticism for retaining his civilian employment
while holding the post of provisional commanding officer in the Regiment and for
his being “an utter stranger” to the customs of Newfoundland society.
91
Dr. Cluny
MacPherson, Surgeon-General of the Methodist Guards and head of the local St.
John Ambulance Brigade, was appointed Principal Medical Officer for the Regi-
ment.
92
His first task was to organize medical examinations for the volunteers, bas-
ing the criteria for service on requirements found in an old Admiralty Blue Book,
the only source locally available on the matter.
93
MacPherson would go on to
achieve fame in 1916 as the inventor of the box respirator gas mask used exten-
sively by British forces.
94
Instructors for the contingent also had to be found locally. W.H. Rennie, trea-
surer of the Rifle Club, offered his services to the Patriotic Association, and was ap-
pointed to head the Musketry Committee, established to supervise arms training.
Rennie had suggested in 1908 that the Newfoundland government subsidize the Ri-
fle Club in order to prepare men for a possible war. At the time, the Daily News had
condemned this idea, saying that rifle competitions were “the luxury of the well-
to-do.” By 1914, caught up in the patriotic fervour, the same newspaper admitted
that it had been “in error,” and offered unqualified praise for Rennie and his organi-
zation.
95
Joseph Moore, a former professional soldier with 21 years service in the
British Army, was placed in charge of drill and musketry training.
96
Captain H.
Ballantine Dykes, a British reserve officer who was in Newfoundland on a fishing
trip, also lent his assistance to the Musketry Committee.
97
To these few men fell the
herculean task of turning civilian volunteers into something resembling a military
force.
By the time the first 500 men had been enlisted, Davidson and the Patriotic As-
sociation had already decided to expand the unit to a strength of over 1,000 in order
to produce a full infantry battalion. Little or no thought was given to how such a unit
could be sustained if the war lasted longer than the widely predicted matter of
months. Nor was the question of making provisions for the replacement of casual-
ties considered in the early stages of the war. Instead, all involved seem to have
been caught up in the spirit of the moment, without regard to an uncertain future and
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apparently without thinking about who might have to take responsibility for such
matters at a later date. Recruiting for a second contingent began on 30 November,
with drill commencing a week later.
98
Enthusiasm in St. John’s was still high, and
179 men enlisted on the first day of recruiting.
99
The problem of maintaining volun-
tary recruitment, though, would come back to haunt the Patriotic Association in
1916, when the Regiment began to sustain major casualties.
NOT READY FOR PRIME TIME: EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING
Although recruiting for the Regiment was already well underway, the venture only
received official sanction on 4 September, when the House of Assembly passed the
Volunteer Force Act. Under the provisions of this legislation, the men of the Regi-
ment were to be subject to the provisions of the Army Act of the British Parliament,
with the exception of corporal punishment. Punishment by death was, however, to
be allowed.
100
In the same session, the Assembly passed a War Measures Act,
granting the Governor in Council wide-ranging powers of censorship, detention,
and deportation, as well as making provisions for strict economic controls.
101
The
legislature also authorized the raising of a $250,000 loan to pay for the equipment
and maintenance of the Regiment.
102
Administration was left in the hands of
Davidson and the Patriotic Association.
The government’s decision to pay the full cost of the contingent was based on
the assumption that the war was unlikely to last more than a few months.
103
This was
an understandable mistake, since many “experts” predicted that the war would be
“the shortest on record.”
104
The British government later agreed to use Army funds
to pay for rations, as well as supply and maintenance of equipment, for elements of
the Regiment on active service. The Newfoundland government was still responsi-
ble for pay, including pensions and allowances, as well as transportation to the UK
and all expenses incurred by the Regiment within Newfoundland. In its first six
months of existence, the Regiment cost the colony approximately $320,000.
105
One of the most immediate difficulties encountered by the Patriotic Associa-
tion was the need to procure proper arms for the Regiment, since the colony was
completely unprepared in this regard. A handful of service rifles and some ammu-
nition were obtained from Calypso, and the local cadet brigades provided some
miniature rifles for target practice, but these were hardly adequate to even begin to
outfit a 500-man infantry unit.
106
Davidson immediately appealed to the imperial
authorities for assistance. In response, the War Office informed the government
that it could only provide 100 rifles. Furthermore, since all existing stocks of the
new short pattern Lee Enfield had gone to the British Army, they could only pro-
vide Newfoundland with rifles of the obsolete Mark 1 long pattern, which did not
accept the latest service ammunition and was of little use for anything other than
drill.
107
After considerable debate, the Musketry Committee decided to purchase
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500 Canadian-made Ross rifles at the “exorbitant cost” of $28 each, having re-
ceived assurances from Canada that these weapons were “suitable in every particu-
lar.”
108
One hundred revolvers, meanwhile, arrived from England on 29 August via
SS Pomeranian, along with 29 pairs of binoculars and 1,000 shoulder badges.
109
As the size of the Regiment increased, the question of arming the force contin-
ued to pose problems, particularly with respect to machine guns. Needless to say,
such weapons could not be found anywhere in or near Newfoundland. The Army
Council in London agreed to make Vickers machine guns available to the Regi-
ment, but only if the Newfoundland authorities were prepared to pay for them, at a
cost of approximately $2,000 each.
110
Once again, the lack of any legal mechanism
for sustaining an armed force posed an obstacle to the Patriotic Association, which
was forced to solicit private donations for a Machine Gun Fund. On hearing of this
problem, W.D. Reid, president of Reid Newfoundland Company, operators of the
transinsular railway, donated two Vickers machine guns to the Regiment in January
1915.
111
This magnanimous gesture may have been intended to improve Reid’s
overwhelmingly negative image in the eyes of a considerable segment of the New-
foundland public. The Advocate, for instance, referred to the railway magnate as
the most “despised or disliked man in the Colony,” one who was “simply hated by
the masses.”
112
If this was Reid’s intent, it seems to have worked, at least in some
circles. The Cadet, a quarterly publication of the Catholic Cadet Corps, hailed his
gift as the most significant private contribution to Imperial forces since Lord
Strathcona’s donation of a cavalry regiment for the Anglo-Boer War.
113
Public re-
sponse to the Machine Gun Fund, meanwhile, was so positive that the collection
drive turned its attention toward an “Airplane Fund” to purchase warplanes for the
Imperial forces. By the late summer of 1915, the fund had raised $53,000. The gov-
ernment immediately purchased two Gnome-Vickers airplanes, at a cost of roughly
$10,000 each. After some discussion, the Patriotic Association decided to buy an-
other airplane, along with six Vickers guns for the Regiment. Donations continued
to come in and by 1917, five planes had been purchased for the British air ser-
vices.
114
If the armament of the Regiment in those early weeks left much to be desired,
the rest of the unit’s equipment was little better. The government decided that,
wherever possible, clothing and equipment for the Regiment should be produced
locally, in order to create employment for the people of the country.
115
This policy,
however, posed certain problems, since Newfoundland’s manufacturing sector
was small and at best rudimentary in its capacity for meeting new demands. It was
quickly discovered, for instance, that the required khaki serge material for uniforms
could not be procured in Newfoundland, so makeshift “fatigue uniforms” were pro-
duced locally, while greatcoats and Australian-style slouch hats, a type of military
headgear made popular by the Anglo-Boer War, were ordered from Montreal.
116
No khaki wool was available to make puttees, the type of leggings worn by British
soldiers of the time, so navy blue wool had to be used, and for the remainder of the
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war the men of the first contingent would be known as the “Blue Puttees.”
117
The
War Office, meanwhile, was unable to supply any regulation web equipment, and
the regiment had to make do with haversacks made of white duck.
118
According to
Davidson, though, the Regiment’s “unprofessional appearance” was “less the re-
sult of unavailability of materials than [of] ignorance on the part of local officials as
to how a soldier should be dressed.”
119
This was hardly surprising, since, as one ob-
server noted, “many of the people, in fact, had never even seen a soldier.”
120
By the
time the second contingent was raised, the Patriotic Association had a slightly
better idea of how to outfit a military force. The Newfoundland Clothing Company
was given a tender to produce clothing of “Regular Khaki Serge ... made according
to the Army Service Uniforms,” for delivery in early January.
121
With the size of the contingent growing daily, the Patriotic Association had to
find a suitable training ground for the new Regiment. An old cricket ground at
Pleasantville, near Quidi Vidi Lake, was chosen as the site for the camp.
122
Montgomerie was placed in charge of the establishment of Regimental Headquar-
ters, and Captain W.H. Franklin was appointed Camp Commandant.
123
The local
mercantile and manufacturing community was quick to assist with the creation of a
military installation at Pleasantville, although their generosity would ultimately
prove to be short-lived. The Anglo-American Telegraph Company installed tele-
phones at the camp, and other local businesses made similar offers of equipment
free of charge.
124
W.D. Reid, also feeling the patriotic spirit, offered all volunteers
free passage on his company’s trains and steamers.
125
Meanwhile, there was a
shortage of transportation to and from the camp, so the government put out a re-
quest for people with motor cars and chauffeurs to lend their vehicles to the Patri-
otic Association.
126
The men of the Regiment went under canvas on 1 September, the day after
their official swearing-in.
127
By the time recruiting for the first contingent was sus-
pended on 26 September, 970 men had enlisted, and 565 of them were in training at
Pleasantville.
128
The training at Pleasantville Camp was also intended to weed out
those who lacked “the powers of endurance for such work.”
129
Indeed, not all of the
volunteers proved satisfactory. A few, once confronted with the discipline and dis-
comfort of camp life, changed their minds about volunteering and were released.
Others were discharged when they proved unsuitable “either from their conduct or
from their inability to shoot.” Most of the volunteers, however, were found suitable
for overseas service.
130
The early volunteers were also almost all medically fit for
service, only three of the first 80 being rejected for health reasons.
131
The rejection
rate would rise rapidly after that, though, and by mid-September roughly 30 percent
of volunteers had been rejected.
132
Not all of those who volunteered were welcomed at Pleasantville. In mid-August,
a man named Franz Lüttge, described by Davidson as “a man of means and leisure
and a stranger to Newfoundland who ha[d] recently taken up residence at Placentia
in the neighbourhood of the marine cable station,” volunteered for service under the
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assumed name of “Smith.” There were soon reports of complaints from the
rank-and-file about the presence of this “young man who had apparently been well
drilled and was of foreign origin,” and Lüttge was forced to resign his position as a
private in the Regiment. He was subsequently placed under close observation, but
“nothing of an incriminatory nature” was found.
133
Lüttge, a Manitoban of German
descent and a former member of the Canadian Militia, was deported in 1915, be-
coming one of a number of “enemy aliens” who received harsh, and generally un-
fair, treatment from the authorities in Newfoundland.
134
Marksmanship training soon began in earnest. By the first week of September,
the rifle range, located on the South Side Hills, was “in constant use from daylight
till dark” under the supervision of the Rifle Association, despite problems with the
outdated rifles which the men were forced to use.
135
There was also a problem with
public safety, since the beginning of marksmanship training coincided with blue-
berry season in the area of the range. Stern warnings to berry-pickers were quickly
placed in local papers.
136
By mid-September, the Regiment had begun “skirmishing
expeditions” in the White Hills, preparing for battle, or at least for what they
thought that battle would be like.
137
Given the enthusiasm in St. John’s for all things
connected with the war, Pleasantville Camp quickly became a local attraction,
drawing hundreds of weekend sightseers.
138
As the summer of 1914 turned to fall, training at Pleasantville proceeded
apace. While there was a slight lull in activity when most of the first contingent
went overseas, by November large numbers of men were again entering the camp.
The second contingent was originally scheduled to train for three night a week, but
because of the pressing need for men in Britain, they went into continuous training
at full pay as soon as they had signed up. As the winter grew closer, the men could
no longer remain in tents at Pleasantville. St. John’s recruits went home at night,
while outport men had to find their own lodgings.
139
Winter conditions soon made
training much more strenuous, as men were forced to drill on icy streets.
140
Despite the unit’s motley appearance, Davidson had high expectations for the
volunteers, at least as far as his despatches to London can be taken as evidence of
his beliefs. When he informed the Colonial Office of the Colony’s intention of pro-
viding a contingent, he suggested that they “be sent to the Guards Depot and at-
tached to the Foot Guards,” since they were all “specially selected men, hard and
hardy, enduring and disciplined and crack shots.”
141
He also claimed that every man
in the Regiment carried “the proverbial Marshal’s baton in his knapsack.”
142
Davidson’s words of praise notwithstanding, the volunteers were hardly an elite
military force. Very few of them had any clear concept of how an army was sup-
posed to function. One officer noted that the Sergeant Major, while showing him-
self to be capable of improvement, lacked “the vaguest ideas of his duties as such or
as a sergeant either.”
143
It was obvious that the men required more preparation than
could be had in St. John’s.
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ACROSS THE POND: THE REGIMENT OVERSEAS
The local authorities were well aware that the facilities at Pleasantville were hardly
adequate to prepare men for actual warfare, and Davidson was anxious to have the
Regiment transferred to the United Kingdom as soon as was possible.
144
Problems
with the weather also emerged as soon as the summer came to a close. The men in
the camp had an “unpleasant time” in one mid-September storm, when 40 tents
were badly damaged.
145
Advised by MacPherson that “cold and exposure” at
Pleasantville camp during the late fall would result in illness, Davidson asked the
British government to approve a departure date of 7 October, the earliest time at
which the Canadian-owned passenger vessel SS Letitia would be available to carry
the Regiment overseas.
146
The British government, however, insisted that the de-
parture of the Regiment be arranged to coincide with that of the convoy carrying the
Canadian Expeditionary Force, which would pass St. John’s on 5 October. Since
the owners of the Letitia were unable to arrange for the vessel to reach St. John’s be-
fore 7 October, and since the Admiralty would not allow the Regiment to delay its
departure, alternative arrangements had to be made.
147
Because preparations for departure had to be rushed through, these proved to
be, in the Governor’s words, “really quite inadequate,” particularly with regard to
the choice of a vessel to replace the Letitia. In the absence of any properly fitted
troopship, Davidson accepted Bowring Brothers’ offer of “the little Florizel,” a
sealing steamer with capacity for 181 passengers, and thus poorly suited to the task
of carrying over 500 soldiers overseas.
148
Living quarters on board were cramped
and, because of a shortage of stewards and cooks, men of the Regiment were forced
to perform ship’s duties.
149
Government officials and the press nevertheless tried to
put a positive spin on the situation, celebrating the fact that the Regiment was leav-
ing on one of Newfoundland’s own ships, with a crew who were “all of their own
country.”
150
Because of concerns that enemy submarines might be operating off the
coast of Newfoundland, the government imposed strict censorship on any details of
the Regiment’s impending departure.
151
The Governor also ordered that no “sus-
pect person” be allowed to leave the Colony in the 10 days prior to embarkment,
and that all “enemy aliens” be closely watched.
152
The first contingent of the Regiment boarded the Florizel on 3 October, being
seen off by one of the largest public gatherings in the history of St. John’s.
153
Ac-
cording to reporters at the scene, the constabulary and naval reservists from Ca-
lypso had their hands full trying to control the huge crowd assembled on the pier.
154
In a farewell letter, one officer thanked those who had seen the Regiment off, and
expressed his hope that the Regiment would “acquit themselves so as to bring no
discredit to the country whose name they bear.”
155
With the ceremonies completed,
the men of the contingent set off for what they thought was “the Great Adven-
ture.”
156
Ironically, the long-awaited Ross rifles arrived on the Reid Newfoundland
Company’s express train twelve hours after the departure of the Florizel. The rifles
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were despatched to England the next day on board SS Durango.
157
The Regiment’s
slouch hats, meanwhile, had arrived earlier in the day aboard SS Mongolian, but
could not be located among the ship’s cargo in time to be distributed to the men on
the Florizel or, indeed, to join the Ross rifles on the Durango.
158
Although there had been some concerns about shipboard discipline before the
Florizel’s departure, the men were remarkably well-behaved and, surprisingly to
some, remained sober. Only one man was punished for insubordination. Shortly be-
fore the Florizel reached England, Alexander was informed that all equipment was
to be dyed khaki. The men had to use an improvised “concoction of brown sugar” to
colour their white haversacks.
159
On 16 October, the Florizel landed at Devonport,
and the 540 men of the Regiment were despatched immediately to Salisbury
Plain.
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When the Newfoundland contingent first arrived in England, they were at-
tached to the 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade at Salisbury Plain, and Lt.-Col. E.B.
Clegg of the Peterborough Rangers was appointed their temporary Commanding
Officer. This assignment did not sit well with the men of the Regiment, however,
since they felt that their distinct identity was being submerged within the much
larger Canadian contingent.
161
Not only were the Newfoundlanders jealous of their
identity, their attitude reflected the fact that relations between Newfoundland and
Canada were somewhat less than rosy at the time, due in no small measure to the on-
going territorial dispute over Labrador.
162
Consequently, the men of the Regiment
wished to be separated from the Canadians at the earliest possible date.
163
In order to satisfy the desires of the men with regard to where they would be
brigaded, the Newfoundland Regiment was despatched to Scotland and placed un-
der the command of a British regular army officer, Lt.-Col. R. de H. Burton of the
Middlesex Regiment.
164
On December 8, the Regiment arrived at Fort George Bar-
racks, near Inverness for further training.
165
In Scotland, the Regiment’s makeshift
blue puttees quickly earned them the nickname “Blacklegs.”
166
Although most as-
sessments of the Regiment were positive, in terms of potential if not actuality, some
observers expressed doubts. One British officer called the Regiment, “the most un-
disciplined lot he had ever seen,” a description in which many of the Newfound-
landers, “who, until their enlistment had said ‘Sir’ to no man,” took considerable
pride.
167
The men of first contingent were joined early in the new year by another batch
of eager Newfoundlanders. The second draft of the Regiment, consisting of nearly
250 men, embarked for Edinburgh on 5 February 1915 aboard the SS Dominion,
though not without difficulty. Ice floes prevented the White Star liner from entering
St. John’s harbour, so the men had to be shuttled from the pier to their transport ship
on the sealing steamer Neptune.
168
A third draft of volunteers departed on 22 March,
aboard SS Orduna, bringing the strength of the Regiment in Scotland to over 1,000
men.
169
This brought the unit up to the full wartime establishment of a British Army
infantry battalion.
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Once ensconced in Scotland, the Newfoundlanders were quick to assert their
distinct national identity. They objected to being described as “Canadians,” al-
though they claimed to bear no “ill-will against their neighbouring Colonials.”
They were, for instance, not particularly impressed when an Inverness newspaper
referred to them as “the Newfoundland section of the Canadian Contingent,” even
though the paper’s comments were otherwise complimentary. The Daily News re-
sponded to its Scottish counterpart by saying that “Newfoundland is grateful for the
kind expressions, but Newfoundlanders are not Canadians.”
170
Similar sentiments
were expressed when a British military band played “The Maple Leaf Forever” to
welcome the Regiment to Fort George. On hearing of this, one person in St. John’s
wrote that “they might as well have played ‘Yankee Doodle’.”
171
Not long after this
incident, the Regiment adopted “The Banks of Newfoundland” as its regimental
march.
172
In the summer of 1915, the Regiment was still stationed in Scotland when a
more serious problem than regimental marching music arose. According to the
Volunteer Force Act, the men had signed on for a period of one year, after which
they would be free to leave.
173
With the end of the first year of the war drawing
closer, the government had to decide whether or not to go back on its word. In the
end, the authorities agreed that the provisions of the act had to be respected, though
not without conditions. While Davidson agreed that anyone desiring a discharge
would be granted one, he insisted that the government would be under no obligation
to take care of men, or the dependents of men, who refused to re-enlist.
174
The men
were also under a great deal of social pressure to remain in uniform, both from their
peers and from those at home, so almost all chose to re-enlist. The 23 men who re-
fused to re-enlist met with a very unfriendly reception when they returned to New-
foundland, the public attitude toward them being so hostile that, according to
Davidson, they “all left their homes and scattered abroad.”
175
Questions were also beginning to surface in 1915 as to the wisdom of the Mus-
ketry Committee in deciding to equip the Regiment with the now-controversial
Ross rifle. In January 1915, Lance Corporal C.F. Garland wrote home from Scot-
land, saying that while “the Ross Rifle is just as good, if not superior, to the Lee
Enfield at target practice, ... we are doubtful if it is as good as a service rifle.”
176
The
accurate but very delicate Ross rifle, the adoption of which had been a pet project of
Canadian Militia Minister Sam Hughes, was by that time proving to be almost
worthless under battlefield conditions as it tended to jam when fired rapidly. By the
spring of 1915, Canadian troops on the western front were discarding their Ross ri-
fles in favour of Lee Enfields taken from dead British soldiers.
177
Despite growing
complaints from troops overseas, back in Newfoundland the Musketry Committee
was authorized by the Patriotic Association to place another order for 200 Ross ri-
fles on 16 September 1915.
178
Problems with the Ross rifle were less politically damaging, however, than the
emergence in October 1915 of accusations of sectarianism with regard to promo-
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tions in the Newfoundland Regiment. While promotions in St. John’s had been al-
located in accordance with the “spoils system,” this local political custom was not
adhered to by British military authorities overseas. On 30 October 1915, P.T.
McGrath, a prominent Roman Catholic member of the Patriotic Association, com-
plained in the Evening Herald that of 22 commissions granted in Scotland, only
three had gone to Catholics. McGrath claimed that the disparity was the result of
bigotry on the part of certain officials, and demanded that Catholics in the Regi-
ment be given a “square deal.”
179
Counter-charges were quickly forthcoming, how-
ever. Coaker’s paper, the Mail and Advocate, accused McGrath of deliberately
stirring up “sectarian agitation” with the purpose of mobilizing Catholic voters
against prohibition, which Coaker and the FPU strongly supported.
180
Meanwhile, in
response to the growing controversy, Lt.-Col. A.W. Whitaker, commander of the
regimental depot at Ayr, insisted that there was no truth to rumours that sectarian-
ism played a role in the promotions of either commissioned or non-commissioned
officers.
181
Resentment over the promotion question, however, would continue into
1916.
182
The controversy over promotions was not the only scandal which plagued the
Regiment in 1915. A number of complaints arose over what many saw as the rather
shoddy administration of the war effort. As early as November 1914, there had been
complaints that the Regiment’s administrative services were poorly organized, re-
sulting in delays of payments to families of men overseas, which led to a rather
heated “newspaper campaign” against the Regiment’s paymaster, Captain Time-
well.
183
In the fall of 1915, further serious rumours began to reach St. John’s, con-
cerning inadequate clothing and rations issued to men overseas. The Mail and Ad-
vocate blamed the Patriotic Association, and by extension the Morris government,
for not doing enough to ensure the comfort of the men overseas.
184
Some critics
even alleged that the Government’s recent insistence on maintaining strict press
censorship was an attempt to hide from the Newfoundland people the fact that the
food and clothing provided the Regiment was inadequate.
185
Faced with intense
criticism, the Regiment conducted an inquiry into the state of supply, at which offi-
cers and men testified that there were few real problems.
186
While the Patriotic As-
sociation managed to straighten matters out enough to assuage most public
criticism, some observers noted that the widespread circulation of these stories
were adversely affecting the recruiting effort.
187
Meanwhile, a Newfoundland War
Contingent Association [WCA] was formed in London in September 1915, led by a
number of prominent individuals with connections to Newfoundland, to take
charge of providing for the “welfare and comfort” of Newfoundlanders on active
service overseas. The WCA was, like the Patriotic Association back at home, a
purely private organization, outside the purview of the Newfoundland govern-
ment.
188
While rumours and scandals created problems for the administration in St.
John’s, the men of the Regiment were by mid-1915 becoming rather restless in
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Scotland. Wakefield complained that living conditions in Edinburgh were of “al-
most too high a standard to form good training for the trenches.”
189
Newfoundland
soldiers were jealous of the fact that Canadians, Australians, and New Zealanders
had already seen action. According to John Gallishaw,
The Newfoundlanders felt that as colonials they had been overlooked. They were not
militaristic, and they hated the ordinary routine of army life, but they wanted to do
their share.
190
Wakefield also remarked that “we have not yet heard of any V.C.s or D.S.O.s hav-
ing been granted for [our] brilliant defence of [Fort George].”
191
Before the summer
ended, the men would get their wish. On 20 August 1915, one year less a day from
the official proclamation of the creation of the 1st Newfoundland Regiment, four
companies of the Regiment boarded SS Megantic at Portsmouth and set sail for the
Mediterranean.
192
In Egypt, the 1st Newfoundland Regiment was assigned to the British 29th In-
fantry Division, a formation made up almost entirely from regular units of the Brit-
ish Army, most of which had been stationed overseas at the outbreak of the war.
Tossing a battalion of civilians, from the colonies no less, into the midst of thou-
sands of hardened professional soldiers would seem to have been a rather question-
able move. At first, the British troops of the division were less than enamoured of
their new comrades. They had little faith in the military abilities of the Newfound-
landers, and for a time there was considerable tension. One particular point of con-
tention was that the Canadian rate of pay received by the Newfoundlanders
amounted to five times the shilling a day given to British soldiers. The Newfound-
land Regiment soon found themselves christened the “Fucking Five Bobbers.”
193
On 19 September 1915, slightly over a year after Governor Davidson first put
out the call for volunteers, the Regiment landed at Suvla Bay to take part in the final
stages of the Gallipoli campaign. Once in the front lines, they soon won the admira-
tion of their British commanders, as well as of the other soldiers in the 29th Divi-
sion.
194
After the end of the failed campaign at the Dardanelles, the 29th Division,
Newfoundlanders still included, would move to the Western Front in the spring of
1916 and begin preparations for the Somme offensive. The service record of the
Regiment has been described at length elsewhere,
195
and need not be recounted
here. Suffice to say that the military performance of the motley crew assembled by
Davidson and the Patriotic Association exceeded all expectations, proving them-
selves, in the words of Field Marshall Haig, to be “better than the best.”
196
Given the
Regiment’s very unorthodox beginning, and the haphazard nature of its mobiliza-
tion, the success achieved in turning Newfoundland’s volunteers into an effective
and coherent fighting unit is little short of amazing. The Regiment’s record also




The way in which the Newfoundland Regiment was raised would, however, lead to
serious problems in the years after 1915. While the enthusiasm for the war which
had swept the capital city in 1914 had enabled the unit to be brought quickly up to
full strength, once the Regiment began to sustain serious casualties the problem of
recruiting became acute. By 1917, it was clear that Newfoundland lacked the de-
mographic base to maintain a regiment in the field through voluntary recruiting.
Combined with a continuation of the string of scandals which plagued the Regi-
ment’s administration in late 1915, the collapse of recruiting undermined the legiti-
macy of the constitutionally nebulous Patriotic Association. In August 1917, a new
National Coalition Government was formed and responsibility for the Regiment’s
administration placed under a Department of Militia.
197
Because of its “unofficial” status, the Patriotic Association had been able to do
little about the shortage of recruits other than appeal to public patriotism. By the
end of 1917, this had proved utterly inadequate in sustaining the Regiment in the
field. The government, however, was reluctant to adopt conscription, given wide-
spread public opposition to any such measure. The matter came to a head, however,
on 21 March 1918, when a massive German offensive on the Western Front threw
the British Army into disarray. Given the deteriorating military situation and the re-
moval of the badly undermanned Royal Newfoundland Regiment from the front
lines, the government had little choice but to vote on 11 May 1918 to impose con-
scription. The resulting debate further polarized Newfoundland’s already fractious
political situation. As well, in a final irony, the war ended before any of the con-
scripted men could see action.
198
The war would also have a destructive effect on Newfoundland’s fragile econ-
omy. While wartime conditions resulted in an expansion of trade,
199
the cost of the
war effort would greatly increase Newfoundland’s public debt. It was estimated
that the Newfoundland Regiment alone cost the country over $16 million over the
course of the war.
200
In the 1930s, this debt load would be the leading factor in New-
foundland’s loss of self-government. While many people in Newfoundland be-
lieved in 1914 that a wholehearted war effort would lead to the achievement of
nationhood, in the end such an effort led to the opposite. The accomplishments of
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